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Abstract. Quantum network coding on the butterfly network has been studied as
a typical example of quantum multiple cast network. We propose secure quantum
network coding on the butterfly network in the multiple unicast setting based on
a secure classical network coding. This protocol certainly transmits quantum states
when there is no attack. We also show the secrecy even when the eavesdropper wiretaps
one of the channels in the butterfly network.
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1. Introduction
Construction of quantum network is one of next targets of quantum information
processing. For this purpose, several researchers [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] have studied
network coding for quantum network, which realizes efficient transmission of quantum
state via quantum network. Network coding has several formulations. Most simple
formulation is the unicast setting, in which, we discuss the one-to-one communication
via the network. This formulation is discussed in many studies on the classical network
coding. Since conventional network has many users, we need to treat networks that has
several users. As such a formulation, we often focus on the multicast setting, in which,
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one sender sends the information to plural receivers. However, in the quantum setting,
it is impossible due to the no-cloning theorem. Hence, we discuss the multiple unicast
setting, which has plural pairs of a sender and receiver. As one of simplest examples of
the multiple unicast setting, we often focus on the butterfly network. Therefore, it is
natural to consider the butterfly network in the framework of quantum network coding.
For example, the paper [13] started a study of quantum network coding with the
butterfly network. The paper [14] clarified the importance of the prior entanglement in
quantum network coding in the case of the butterfly network. The papers [15, 16, 17, 18]
generalized these results to more general settings. As quantum information processing
is related to secure protocols, the security analysis is more needed for quantum network
coding. Now, we consider the case when there is a possibility that an adversary might
attack the quantum network. In this case, we can guarantee the security in these
existing codes if we verify the non-existence of the eavesdropper. However, this method
requires us to repeat the same quantum state transmission several times. It is impossible
to guarantee the security under the single transmission in the simple application of
these existing methods because the verification requires several times of transmission.
Therefore, it is needed to propose a quantum network code to guarantee the security.
For this purpose, we consider a natural extension of the methods of classical secure
network coding.
Although the paper [23] started the study of network coding for the classical
network, the paper [1] initiated to address the security of network coding, and
pointed out that the network coding enhances the security. Currently, many papers
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] have already studied the secrecy for network coding.
These papers offers the security even when Eve eavesdrops a fixed number of links in
the given network. That is, the security is guaranteed whatever links are eavesdropped
when the number of eavesdropped links is less than the given threshold. Moreover, the
multiple unicast setting has not been well examined even in the classical case, i.e., only
a few papers such as Agarwal et al. [28] discuss this setting with classical case.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a protocol to guarantee the security for
the transmitted quantum state in the single-shot setting under the butterfly network
even when any link is eavesdropped whenever the number of eavesdropped links is one.
This type code is a natural extension of the above classical secure network coding,
and realizes the security without verification. To realize the above requirements, our
code needs an additional shared randomness in the sink side, which is not needed in
the original classical network code. Since quantum channel is much more expensive
than classical public channel, we assume that any amount of classical public channel
is freely used. Under this assumption, transmission of quantum state is equivalent to
sharing maximally entangled state via quantum teleportation [22]. So, we prove that
the entangled state is shared by sending entanglement halves from sink nodes via our
protocol under the above assumption.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
several notations for the butterfly network of the multiple unicast setting, and a secure
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classical network coding protocol on the butterfly network. In Section 3, we explain our
secure quantum network coding protocol. Section 4 shows the secrecy of the transmitted
quantum states even when any one of the quantum channels in the butterfly network.
2. Preparation and classical protocol
We focus on the quantum butterfly network based on the finite filed Fp := Z/pZ with
prime p ≥ 3 as Fig. 1. The task is transmitting quantum states from two source nodes V1
and V2 to two sink nodes V5 and V6 via the quantum communication network composed
of intermediate nodes V3 and V4 and the edges e(5), . . . , e(11), which correspond to
quantum channels. In this network, the two source nodes V1 and V2 share a common
random number, and two sink nodes V5 and V6 share another common random number.
In the quantum setting, we need to separately describe input quantum state and
encoding operation. So, we treat virtually vertices that have only quantum system and
does not have any operation. Since we make quantum operations in both source nodes
V1 and V2 and both sink nodes V5 and V6, we additionally prepare input vertices I1 and
I2 and output vertices O1 and O2 as other edges. Hence, inputting halves of entangled
states in both input vertices I1 and I2, we can check our protocol generates entangled
states between other entanglement halves and output vertices O1 and O2.
Therefore, we address the following quantum network. The edges of this network
are composed of input vertices I1 and I2, output vertices O1 and O2, classical shared
randomness sources S1 and S2, and nodes V1, . . . V6. The edges of this network
are composed of e(1), . . . , e(15). Here, only edges e(3), e(4), e(14), e(15) are classical
channels, and other edges are quantum channels. The numbers assigned to edges express
the time ordering of the transmission on the corresponding channel.
 


 
 


 1  2
 3  4
 8
 7
 9
 10  11
 13
 12

 5  6

 15
 14
Figure 1. Butterfly network
To give our quantum network coding, as a preparation, we proposed a specific type
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of a novel classical network coding of the multiple-unicast task in the butterfly network.
To express the information flow, we denote the information on the edge e(i) by Zi.
That is, the aim of our coding is to transmit the information from V1 (V2) to V6 (V5),
respectively. For this purpose, we employ the following coding on the respective edges
of the network. We assume the following information flow of the butterfly network.
V1 Z5 := 2Z1 + Z3, Z7 := Z1 + Z3.
V2 Z6 := 2Z2 + Z4, Z8 := Z2 + Z4.
V3 Z9 := Z5 + Z6.
V4 Z10 := Z9, Z11 := Z9.
V5 Z13 :=
1
2
Z10 − Z7.
V6 Z12 :=
1
2
Z11 − Z8. (1)
Here, we denote the information to be sent from Ii and the shared randomness
generated in Si by Ai andBi, respectively. So, we have Z1 = A1, Z2 = A2, Z3 = Z4 = B1,
Z14 = Z15 = B2. In this classical setting, we do not use the second shared randomness
B2. Therefore, we obtain the information flow with respect to the original information
A1, A2, and Bi in Fig. 2. So, we find that the sink nodes V6 and V5 correctly recover the
information A1 and A2, respectively. Thanks to the shared randomness, even though

  
2  

2  
  
 
2  2  2

2  2  2
 


 
Figure 2. Information flow in butterfly network
the eavesdropper, Eve, wiretaps one of edges e(5), . . . , e(11), she cannot obtain any
information for A1 and A2.
Since the resultant values Z1, . . . , Z13 are determined by A1, A2, and B1, we can
choose coefficients mj,k such that
Zj = mj,1A1 +mj,2A2 +mj,3B1. (2)
Now, we assume that Eve attacks one of the channels {e(5), · · · , e(11)}, which is denoted
by eA. That is, Eve intercepts the channel eA, keeps the information in eA on her hand,
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and sends a new information E1 though eA. In this case, we denote the resultant values
by Z ′j, which are determined by A1, A2, B1, and E1. Since the coefficients are different
from mj,k, we can choose other coefficients m
′
j,k such that
Z ′j = m
′
j,1A1 +m
′
j,2A2 +m
′
j,3B1 +m
′
m,4E1. (3)
We should remark that the coefficient {m′i,j}ij depends on the choice of eA, that is, the
edge that Eve attacks. We can easily show the security of this classical network coding
against this attack of Eve.
Here, we should remark the relation with existing works. Indeed, the paper [28]
discussed classical secure network coding for multiple unicast scenario with butterfly
network. However, they did not consider our code because they did not introduce
shared randomness.
3. Quantum protocol
Based on the above classical protocol, we make a protocol to transmit quantum states
by the means of the idea used in [15, 17, 18]; our method is generalized from methods
[15, 17, 18] in order to treat classical shared randomness on the quantum network coding.
Our problem is formulated as transmission of quantum states in the Hilbert spaces
H1 and H2 to the output quantum systems H12 and H13 that correspond to the edges
e(12) and e(13), respectively, where these quantum systems are spanned by the Z-
basis {|a〉}p−1a=0. Since edges e(5), . . . , e(11) correspond to quantum channels, we assign
them to the the same-dimensional quantum system H5, . . . ,H11, respectively. Since the
shared randomness B1 and B2 are classical information, the edges e(3), e(4), e(14), e(15)
correspond to classical systems. The variable B1 takes values in Fp, but the variable B2
takes in F2p. So, while the edges e(3) and e(4) send one element of Fp in one time, the
edges e(14), e(15) send 2 elements of Fp in one time.
Our protocol is given as Protocol 1, which is composed of four steps. The unitaries
used in Step 3 are given as follows.
U5(b1) :=
∑
a1,z5
|a1〉1|2a1 + b1 + z5〉5 1〈a1| 5〈z5|
U6(b1) :=
∑
a2,z6
|a2〉2|2a2 + b1 + z6〉6 2〈a2| 6〈z6|
U7(b1) :=
∑
a1,z7
|a1〉1|a1 + b1 + z7〉7 1〈a1| 7〈z7|
U8(b1) :=
∑
a2,z8
|a2〉2|a2 + b1 + z5〉8 2〈a2| 8〈z8|,
U9 :=
∑
z5,z6,z9
|z5〉5|z6〉6|z5 + z6 + z9〉9 5〈z5| 6〈z6| 9〈z9|
U10 :=
∑
z9,z10
|z9〉1|z9 + z10〉10 9〈z9| 10〈z10|
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U11 :=
∑
z9,z11
|z9〉1|z9 + z11〉11 9〈z9| 11〈z11|
U12 :=
∑
z8,z11,z12
|z8〉8|z11〉11|
1
2
z11 − z8 + z12〉12
8〈z8| 11〈z11| 12〈z12|
U13 :=
∑
z7,z10,z13
|z7〉7|z10〉10|
1
2
z10 − z7 + z13〉13
7〈z7| 10〈z10| 13〈z13|.
The X-basis used in Step 3 is given as |φb〉 :=
1√
p
∑p−1
a=0 ω
ab|a〉, where ω := e2πi/p. The
phase shift operator used in Step 4 is defined as X :=
∑p−1
a=0 ω
a|a〉〈a|.
Protocol 1 Secure network coding Protocol for butterfly network
STEP 1: [Initialization] The system Hi is prepared on the vertex u with e(i) = (u, v)
for i ≥ 5. The systems H1 andH2 are prepared on the vertices V1 and V2, respectively.
We set the states on H1 and H2 to the states to be sent. We set the states on
H5, . . . ,H13 to be |0〉.
STEP 2: [Transmission] The time counter starts from time 5. At time i with 5 ≤ i ≤
13, we apply unitary Ui on node u with e(i) = (u, v) based on the shared randomness
B1 = b1. Then, we send Hi to the node v through the quantum channel e(i).
STEP 3: [Measurement on X-basis] We measure the systems H1,H2,H5, . . . ,H13 with
the X-basis {|φk〉}
p−1
k=0, and obtain the outcomes C1, C2, C5 . . . , C11. The outcomes
C1, C2, C5 . . . , C11 are sent to the sink nodes V5 and V6 via public channels. Only
the outcomes C10, C11 are exchanged between the sink nodes V5 and V6 by using the
shared randomness B2.
STEP 4: [Recovery] Based on the outcomes C1, C2, C5 . . . , C11, The sink node V5
applies the unitary X−
∑
k∈E Ckmk,2 on H13. The sink node V6 applies the unitary
X
−∑k∈E Ckmk,1 on H12, where E := {1, 2, 5, 6, . . . , 11}.
Now, we prove that the protocol properly transmits quantum states if there is no
attack. For this purpose, we input entanglement halves in H1,H2. Let H˜1, H˜2 be the
reference systems of H1,H2. We prepare the maximally entangled state |Φ〉1˜,1|Φ〉2˜,2,
where |Φ〉 := 1√
p
∑p−1
a=0 |a, a〉. When the shared randomness B1 is b1, the resultant state
at after Step 2 is
1
p
∑
a1,a2
|a1, a2〉1˜,2˜|m1,1a1 +m1,2a2 +m1,3b1,
m2,1a1 +m2,2a2 +m2,3b1,
m5,1a1 +m5,2a2 +m5,3b1,
. . . ,
m11,1a1 +m11,2a2 +m11,3b1,
a1, a2〉5,...,13. (4)
Secure Quantum Network Coding on Butterfly Network 7
When we obtain the outcomes c1, . . . , c11 at Step 3, the resultant state is
1
p
∑
a1,a2
ω
∑
k∈E ck(mk,1a1+mk,2a2+mk,3b1)|a1, a2〉1˜,2˜|a1, a2〉12,13
= X
∑
k∈E Ckmk,1
12 X
∑
k∈E Ckmk,2
13 ω
∑
k∈E Ckmk,3b1 |Φ〉1˜,12|Φ〉2˜,13. (5)
Therefore, the resultant state after Step 4 is ω
∑
k∈E Ckmk,3b1 |Φ〉1˜,12|Φ〉2˜,13, which is the
same as |Φ〉1˜,12|Φ〉2˜,13 nevertheless the value of b1.
4. Security analysis
In this section, we prove the secrecy of the protocol against Eve’s attack under the
assumption that Eve does not know the shared randomness B1 and B2. We consider the
situation that Eve attacks the quantum channel eA, where eA = e(jE) with 5 ≤ jE ≤ 11.
In this situation, the most general attack of Eve can be described as follows: In Step
2 of the protocol, Eve intercepts eA, and applies a quantum operation ΛE defined from
HjE to HE ⊗ HjE . Then, Eve keeps HE and sends back HjE to the quantum channel
eA. Further, in Step 3, Eve can access the information sent through the public channels
except C10 and C11, which are encoded by means of B2.
Here, we introduce notations: M ′ is the matrix composed of {m′i,j}i,j with 1st, 2nd,
5th, · · ·,13th raws and 1− 4th columns. Remember that the entries m′i,j are introduced
in (3). Let λ(a, b, x, y) be an operator on HE defined by
λ(a, b, x, y) := (IE ⊗ 〈x|jE) · ΛE (|a〉〈b|) · (IE ⊗ |y〉jE) . (6)
Then, it satisfies ΛE (|a〉〈b|) =
∑
x,y λ(a, b, x, y) ⊗ |x〉〈y|, where 0 ≤ a, b, x, y ≤ p − 1.
We further define an operator σb on HE depending on 0 ≤ b ≤ p− 1 as
σb :=
p−1∑
a=0
λ(a, a, b, b) = (IE ⊗ 〈b|jE) · ΛE (IjE) · (IE ⊗ |b〉jE) . (7)
From the definition of the operator λ(a, b, x, y), σb is a positive operator and depends
on the choice of ΛE.
Our first observation is that we can judge the secrecy of the input state only from
the reduced density matrix after the protocol on Eve’s system and the reference system,
which does not depend on whether we apply the recovery operation in the step 4 or not.
Hence, we omit step 4 in our calculation for the security proof.
First, the resultant state after Step 2, which was Eq.(4) in the presence of Eve, is
proportional to ∑
a1,a2,a′1,a
′
2
,b1,e1,e′1
|a1, a2〉〈a
′
1, a
′
2|1˜,2˜
⊗ |M ′(a1, a2, b1, e1)
T 〉〈M ′(a′1, a
′
2, b1, e
′
1)
T |1,2,5,···,13
⊗ λ
(
~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , ~mE · (a
′
1, a
′
2, b1)
T , e1, e
′
1
)
, (8)
where ~mE := (mjE ,1, mjE ,2, mjE ,3).
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In Step 3, we separately consider the measurements on the systems H10 ⊗H11 and
the measurements on the remaining systems. Since Eve does not know the outcomes C10
and C11, from Eve’s viewpoint, the measurements on the systems H10⊗H11 is equivalent
to just tracing out H10⊗H11. Further, since we omit the step 4, the systems H12⊗H13
is not implemented any operation after the step 2. Hence, we can trace out H12 ⊗H13
as well. So, we trace out H10 ⊗ H11 ⊗ H12 ⊗ H13 from our calculation of the states.
This calculation of the tracing-out depends on the choice of eA. But the results of the
calculation can be written in the same form and the state on the remaining systems
before the measurement is proportional to∑
a1,a2,b1,e1
|a1, a2〉〈a1, a2|1˜,2˜
⊗ |M ′′(a1, a2, b1, e1)
T 〉〈M ′′(a1, a2, b1, e1)
T |1,2,5,···,9
⊗ λ
(
~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , ~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , e1, e1
)
, (9)
where the matrix M ′′ is the submatrix of M ′ derived by removing 10−13th raws. Here,
we only present the derivation of the above equation for the case eA = e(7); we can
similarly derive the equation in the other case. In the case eA = e(7), we derive
(Z10, Z11, Z12, Z13)
= (2a1 + 2a2 + 2b1, 2a1 + 2a2 + 2b1, a1, a1 + a2 + b1 − e1). (10)
Hence, the state derived by tracing outH10⊗H11⊗H12⊗H13 from Eq.(8) is proportional
to ∑
a1,a2,a′1,a
′
2
,b1,e1,e′1
|a1, a2〉〈a
′
1, a
′
2|1˜,2˜
⊗ |M ′′(a1, a2, b1, e1)
T 〉1,···,9〈M
′′(a′1, a
′
2, b1, e
′
1)
T |1,···,9
⊗ λ
(
~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , ~mE · (a
′
1, a
′
2, b1)
T , e1, e
′
1
)
δ(2a1 + 2a2 + 2b1, 2a
′
1 + 2a
′
2 + 2b1)
δ(2a1 + 2a2 + 2b1, 2a
′
1 + 2a
′
2 + 2b1)
δ(a1, a
′
1)δ(a1 + a2 + b1 − e1, a
′
1 + a
′
2 + b1 − e
′
1). (11)
It is easy to check the above equation is equal to Eq.(9).
Without losing generality, we assume that Eve writes all the measurement outcomes
that she derived in Step 3 into the Hilbert space Hν on Eve’s hand. Then, the state on
H˜1 ⊗ H˜2 ⊗HE ⊗Hν after the protocol is proportional to∑
a1,a2,b1,e1, ~C
|a1, a2〉〈a1, a2|1˜,2˜ ⊗ | ~C〉〈 ~C|ν
⊗ λ
(
~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , ~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , e1, e1
)
, (12)
where ~C = (C1, C2, C5, · · · , C9) . Since mjE ,3 6= 0 for any choice of eA, for fixed a1 and
a2, λ satisfies∑
b1
λ
(
~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , ~mE · (a1, a2, b1)
T , e1, e1
)
= σe1 . (13)
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From Eqs. (12) and (13), the state on H˜1 ⊗ H˜2 ⊗ HE ⊗ Hν after the protocol is
proportional to(∑
e1
σe1
)
⊗ I1˜2˜ ⊗ Iν . (14)
Hence, Eve’s system after the protocol is independent from the reference system. This
completes the proof of the secrecy of our protocol. Therefore, our procol is secure from
Eve’s attack any one of the edges e(5), · · · , e(11).
At the last part of this section, we show the necessity of the shared randomness
B2. As we have explained, the corresponding classical network coding on the butterfly
network does not have a shared randomness corresponding to B2. On the other hand, in
our protocol, we use B2 taking value in F
2
p, which is equal to two elements of Fp and used
to send C10 and C11, securely. Here, we consider the situation that only C11 is encoded
by shared randomness, and Eve derives the information of C10. This is the case when
the size of B2 is Fp, which is smaller than that of the present protocol. It is possible to
show that the protocol is not secure in this case, and there exists an attack of Eve by
which she can derive the information of the quantum states. Suppose Eve attacks the
channel e(11) by ΛE that is defined as ΛE(|a〉〈b|) := |a〉〈b|E ⊗ |φ0〉〈φ0|11; that is, Eve
just keeps the state on e(11) on her hands, and sends |φ0〉 back to the channel e(11).
By the straightforward calculation, we can show that the state on H˜1 ⊗ H˜1 ⊗HE after
the protocol is
1
p3
∑
a1,a2,a′1,b1
|a1, a2〉〈a
′
1a2|1˜2˜ ⊗ |2a1 + 2a2 + 2b1〉〈2a
′
1 + 2a2 + 2b1|E.
Hence, Eve’s system is not independent from the reference system, and Eve can derive
the information of the quantum state to be sent in this protocol. Therefore, for the
security of the protocol, we need to hide both C10 and C11 from Eve, and we need to
use the extra shared randomness B2 taking the value in F
2
p.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed secure quantum network coding on the butterfly network in the
multiple unicast setting based on a secure classical network coding. This protocol
certainly transmits quantum states when there is no attack. We also have shown
the secrecy even when the eavesdropper wiretaps one of the channels in the butterfly
network, which does not require any additional verification protocol.
Our security proof can be extended to a more general situation [30]. That is,
when the corresponding classical network code satisfies the robustness [24, 25, 26, 27] in
addition to the secrecy, we can prove the security similar to this paper. Here, we need
to discuss the secrecy even when the eavesdropper contaminates a part of information
as well as eavesdrops the part of information like [29] while the conventional security
papers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] for network coding discussed only the secrecy
only when the eavesdropper eavesdrops a part of information but does not contaminate
Secure Quantum Network Coding on Butterfly Network 10
the part of information. Since this kind of general analysis requires much more pages,
we cannot discuss it in this paper. So, our next paper discusses this kind of security
analysis for quantum network coding.
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